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INTRODUCTION
Women were not permitted to serve on juries for most of United
States history.' As recently as 1961, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a state jury selection scheme that permitted women
to serve on juries only if they filed a written declaration expressing
their desire to be eligible for service.2 Part I of this article traces
this history of women's exclusion from jury service in the United
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School, for his thoughtful and thorough comments on an early draft of this article. I would
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1. See Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 59-60
(1986).
2. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58, 69 (1961).
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States, ending with J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court's decision in 1994
that prohibited the use of gender-based peremptory challenges.3
Responses to J.E.B. have been mixed, and this article discusses
criticisms of the opinion in detail.
Part II of this article explores social science research on gender
dynamics in simulated jury trials. Although the Supreme Court
based its decision in J.E.B. partly on the principle that generaliza-
tions about male and female jurors are overbroad and invidious,
research has identified gender differences in the decision-making of
mock jurors.4 In addition, male and female jurors behave differently
in the quantity and substance of their contributions to group
deliberations.
Part III makes several recommendations based on the social
science research concerning gender and jury dynamics. Ultimately,
this article argues that male and female jurors are not fungible, and
that the criminal justice system should not pretend that they are.
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT LAW
A. Women and Jury Service in America: An Historical Overview
The history of women and jury service in the United States is
one of systematic exclusion,' dating back to the English common
law.6 This tradition continued with the founding of the United
States. With the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established
that federal jurors must meet the qualifications required by the
state in which the federal court was sitting.' Because every state at
that time disqualified women from jury service, the first Congress
clearly did not interpret the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
to require that women sit on jury panels.'
There were many justifications for the exclusion of women from
jury service. Because most women were confined to the domestic
sphere of the household during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, opponents of women's jury service argued that women
lacked the worldly experience necessary to make informed decisions
3. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
4. Id. at 131.
5. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 59-60 ("[Flor most of American history, jury service was
restricted to men.") (citation omitted).
6. Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 38 (1992).
7. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975).
8. Id.
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as jurors.9 Some opponents also argued that "the indelicacies of
jury service would interfere with women's ability to maintain the
purity required by their [domestic] role in the home."1 ° Proponents
of women's jury service did not challenge their opponents' presump-
tion that a woman's proper place was in the home.11 Unlike their
opponents, however, these advocates argued that women occupy a
unique role that would contribute positively to the legal world by
bringing their voice of "domestic virtue" into the courtroom.12 As
late as 1961, the Supreme Court used this argument to uphold a
jury system allowing women to serve as jurors only if they volun-
teered, stating that a "woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life."13
Eventually, the proponents of women's jury service prevailed. In
1898, Utah became the first state to authorize women to participate
on juries.14 The tradition of excluding women from jury service,
however, was slow to change. During the Second World War, twenty
years after the passage of the women's suffrage amendment in
1920,15 twenty-one states still prohibited female jurors.1 6 Three
states (Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina) continued to ban
women from juries as late as 1962."7 With the Civil Rights Act of
1957, Congress finally provided that all citizens, including women,
were competent to serve as federal jurors, regardless of state law.18
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Women and Jury Service
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of female jury
service in 1946.1' In Ballard, women were systematically excluded,
for reasons that are unclear in the decision, from the defendants'
trial in federal court in California.2" The defendants alleged that
this exclusion was improper because California law would allow
women to serve on juries, thereby establishing women's eligibility
9. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 68.
10. Id. at 66.
11. Id. at 67.
12. Id. at 71.
13. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
14. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 n.13 (1975).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
16. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 60-61.
17. Id.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a to 1975e (2005)). See also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 536.
19. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
20. Id. at 191.
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for jury service in federal courts in California.21 The Supreme
Court agreed with the defendants, holding that "the purposeful
and systematic exclusion of women from the panel in this case was
a departure from the scheme of jury selection which Congress
adopted,"22 and dismissed the indictment. 3
Some of the rhetoric in Ballard adopted the same tone as the
early proponents of jury service for women, portraying female jurors
as contributing a valuable perspective to the judicial process.24
Because their viewpoint is so important, the Court found that the
exclusion of women from jury service was unacceptable. 25 The Court
wrote:
It is said, however, that an all male panel drawn from the
various groups within a community will be as truly representa-
tive as if women were included. The thought is that the factors
which tend to influence the action of women are the same as
those which influence the action of men - personality, back-
ground, economic status - and not sex. Yet it is not enough to
say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to
act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe
were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly
representative of the community if all men were intentionally
and systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that
the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively
of one is different from a community composed of both; the
subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the
imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not
in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion of one may
indeed make the jury less representative of the community than
would be true if an economic or racial group were excluded."
The Court's justification for its decision in Ballard rested on a
theory that views each sex as contributing something unique to the
process of jury deliberations.27
Notably, the Court did not ground its analysis upon the idea
that women are equal to men, and therefore, deserve the same civic
rights enjoyed by men. Rather, the Court stated that female jurors
21. Id. at 190-91.
22. Id. at 193.
23. Id. at 196.
24. Id. at 194-95.
25. See id. at 193.
26. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
27. See id. at 194-95.
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bring a distinct voice to the jury room, one that must be heard for
the jury to be truly representative of the community.28 In discussing
the importance of creating a "broad base" for the jury system, and
thereby ensuring representativeness, the Court compared women,
as a group, to a racial group or an economic or social class.29 The
female perspective, like the contributions of diverse racial and social
groups, is so important that the Court wrote that "the exclusion of
women from jury panels may at times be highly prejudicial to the
defendants."3 °
The Supreme Court applied the rhetoric of the original oppo-
nents of female jury service to another case, Hoyt v. Florida,3 in
1961. The appellant in Hoyt, a woman convicted of second-degree
murder by an all-male jury, argued that Florida's jury statute
violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by unconstitu-
tionally excluding women from jury service. The Florida statute
provided that women would not be called for jury service unless they
registered their desire to be eligible to serve on juries with the clerk
of the circuit court.33 Rejecting Hoyt's claim and upholding the
Florida statute constitutional on its face and as applied, the Supreme
Court identified the relevant inquiry as "whether the exemption [of
women from jury service unless they affirmatively registered for that
duty] itself is based on some reasonable classification and whether
the manner in which it is exercisable rests on some rational founda-
tion." 4 In analyzing the purpose of the Florida jury statute, the
Court concluded that it rested upon a reasonable classification when
it wrote:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the
restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved
to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for
a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that
a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent
with her own special responsibilities.35
28. See id. at 194.
29. Id. at 195.
30. Id.
31. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
32. See id. at 58.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 58, 61.
35. Id. at 61-62.
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With this reasoning, the Court upheld the Florida statute using the
same rhetoric the original opponents of jury service for women
espoused: Women may be reasonably exempted from jury service
based on the unique domestic role they play in society."6
Only fourteen years later, in the case of Taylor v. Louisiana,7 the
Supreme Court essentially reversed its decision in Hoyt v. Florida.
Taylor involved a constitutional challenge to Louisiana's statutory
scheme for jury selection.38 At that time, Louisiana law provided that
a woman should not be selected as a juror unless she had previously
filed a written declaration stating her desire to be eligible for jury
service.39 The appellant, Taylor, appealed his conviction for aggravated
kidnapping on the grounds that Louisiana's jury selection system
violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a
fair and impartial jury.4" The Supreme Court held that Taylor had,
indeed, been deprived of his right to an impartial jury and reversed his
conviction.41
The Court in Taylor relied heavily on the importance of selecting
a "petit jury from a representative cross section of the community,"4
holding that such a right "is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial."43 Justice White, writing for the
majority, reasoned that the purpose of the jury is to protect citizens
from the government's exercise of arbitrary power." This protection
could not be guaranteed "if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded
from the pool."4 Quoting extensively from Ballard, the Court
concluded that excluding women from jury service violates the goal
of securing representativeness in the jury pool.46 The Court also
relied on social science research to support the proposition that
"women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that
influence both jury deliberation and result."47
Despite its emphasis on the fair cross section requirement, the
Court cautioned that this requirement "must have much leeway in
36. Id.
37. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
38. Id. at 523.
39. Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 402 (repealed
1974)).
40. Id. at 524-25.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 528.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 530.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 531-32.
47. Id. at 532 n.12.
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application" and recognized that the states retain broad discretion
in this area.4" A resulting significant limitation to the holding in
Taylor is that petit juries need not actually reflect diverse popula-
tions in the community; rather, the jury must be drawn only from
a pool that is "fairly representative" of the community.49 Defendants,
therefore, "are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. 5 °
In finding the jury selection scheme in Louisiana unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court in Taylor seemingly overruled its holding
in Hoyt v. Florida. The Court distinguished its prior holding by
stating that "Hoyt did not involve a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a[n impartial] jury [that is] drawn from a fair cross section
of the community.""1 The challenge in Hoyt, based on due process
and equal protection grounds, was unsuccessful because the State
of Florida demonstrated that there was a sufficiently rational basis
for its statute.52 Taylor's challenge, based on the Sixth Amendment,
could not be defeated by the rational basis test. 3 Although the
Court did not articulate the precise showing needed to justify
Louisiana's law, it did note that there must be "weightier reasons"
than a demonstration of a mere rational basis.54
Although the majority in Taylor tried to distinguish Hoyt, it
nonetheless disavowed a crucial part of the analysis supporting
the Hoyt decision.55 In Hoyt, the Court relied heavily on the notion
that a "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life" to support the rationality of Florida's regulation regarding
women and juries.56 The Taylor court, however, cited statistics from
the Department of Labor to support the view that a majority of
women in 1974 were in the labor force, including nearly half of all
women with children under eighteen years of age.5 ' This changing
reality in women's lives, the Court stated, "put[s] to rest the
suggestion that all women should be exempt from jury service based
solely on their sex and [their] presumed role in the home."5 "
The Supreme Court in Taylor rested uneasily on a conflicted
notion of the nature of women's participation on juries. Following
48. Id. at 538.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 534.
52. Id. at 533-34.
53. Id. at 534.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
57. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 535 n.17.
58. Id.
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the analysis of Ballard, the Court stated that differences between
the two sexes require that women, as well as men, be represented
in jury pools to ensure a fair cross section of the community.59 This
view of a woman's perspective comports with the historical notion
that women offer a different voice because of their unique position
in the home.6" At the same time, however, the Taylor Court
explicitly disagreed with the idea, articulated in Hoyt, that a
woman's role is presumptively, and exclusively, within the home.6
In this regard, Taylor marked the beginning of a shift in rhetoric
about women and their contribution to jury deliberations. The
Supreme Court affirmed women's different voices to support its view
that juries must be drawn from a representative sample of the
community, yet expressed discomfort with the idea that women
remained limited by their traditional domestic role.62 With this
latter concept, and the accompanying acknowledgment that
women's roles were evolving, the Court began to conceive of male
and female jurors as equal contributors to the deliberation process.
C. Gender and the Use of the Peremptory Challenge
1. J.E.B. v. Alabama
Recent debates about women and their contributions in the jury
room have centered around the use of the peremptory challenge.63
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Batson that a prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding jurors solely
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.64 The
principle of Batson later was extended to other cases.6" Following
conflicting federal opinions regarding the applicability of Batson to
59. See id. at 530-32.
60. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 67, 71. See also supra text accompanying note 10.
61. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534, 535 n.17.
62. See id. at 530, 534-35 n.17.
63. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
64. Id. at 88-89.
65. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendants,
as well as government prosecutors, from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination through
the use of peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(extending the principle of Batson to civil cases as well as criminal cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant could object to peremptory challenges used
to exclude jurors of a particilar race, regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded
jurors are of the same race).
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gender-based peremptory strikes,66 as well as competing recommen-
dations from academia, the Supreme Court ruled in J.E.B. v.
Alabama that intentional gender discrimination through the use of
peremptory strikes violates the Equal Protection Clause.8
J.E.B. involved a paternity suit brought by the State of Alabama
to obtain an order compelling the petitioner, J.E.B., to pay child
support.69 The all-female jury made a finding of paternity, and
J.E.B. appealed.7" J.E.B. argued that the State had violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by using
nine of its ten peremptory challenges to strike men from the jury
panel.7' In a six to three split, the Supreme Court agreed with
J.E.B., reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of
Alabama and holding that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the
assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for
no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a
woman or happens to be a man."7
In its ruling, the Court described the history of excluding women
from juries in the United States and summarized its prior decisions
regarding gender and jury selection.73 Given this history of gender
discrimination, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, framed
the "only question" raised by J.E.B. as "whether discrimination on
the basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the
State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial."74
The State of Alabama argued that its decision to strike virtually all
males from the jury was based on a legitimate perception that
females would be more receptive to the State's arguments in favor
of a finding of paternity.7" The Court dismissed this argument in a
footnote, finding that "[t]he majority of studies suggest that gender
66. Compare United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc, 960
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that gender-based peremptory strikes are imper-
missible), with United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend
the protection of Batson to gender).
67. Compare Forman, supra note 6, at 56-67 (arguing that the holding in Batson should
not be extended to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges), with Note, Beyond Batson:L
Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1922 (1992)
(proposing that the holding in Batson should be extended to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges).
68. 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994).
69. Id. at 129.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 127, 146.
73. Id. at 131-36.
74. Id. at 136-37.
75. Id. at 137-38.
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plays no identifiable role in jurors' attitudes."76 Even if the State
could demonstrate some level of empirical validity behind its
strategy of striking male jurors, the Court stated that such a
"measure of truth" would not justify the use of gender stereotypes
in choosing a jury because "gender classifications that rest on
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even
when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generaliza-
tion."77 The decision also noted that generalizations about the
perceived attitudes of male and female jurors are overbroad.7"
Furthermore, the Court in J.E.B. relied heavily on the notion that
gender stereotypes are unwarranted and that gender alone is not
predictive of a juror's attitudes.79 In doing so, however, the Court
ignored a body of social science research indicating that gender may
affect how a person makes decisions, particularly in the jury room.80
Another criticism of J.E.B. stems partly from the posture of the
case: J.E.B. was a lawsuit brought by a defendant to challenge the
use of peremptory strikes by the State."' In its opinion, the .Court
never addressed whether a defendant might persuasively argue that
the use of gender-based peremptory challenges was necessary to
preserve his or her right to a fair and impartial trial under the Sixth
Amendment. Indeed, in J.E.B. the Court gave little attention to the
Sixth Amendment at all, aside from noting in a brief paragraph that
"voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors." 2 Justice
Blackmun wrote that "[d]iscrimination in jury selection, whether
based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the
community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded
from participation in the judicial process."8 3 The Court supported its
"harm to the litigants" rationale by stating merely that "the
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will
76. Id. at 138 n.9. Although the works cited by the Court in J.E.B. support the proposition
that gender is not a factor in jurors' decisions, other psychological studies indicate otherwise.
See infra Part II.B-C.
77. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.il.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 138 n.9, 139 n.l1.
80. See infra Part II.B-C.
81. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
82. Id. at 143. In noting that "[v]oir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied
bias and a firmer basis [than stereotypical notions] upon which the parties may exercise their
peremptory challenges intelligently," the Court presumably recognized that some jurors,
regardless of their gender, may have certain notions about gender issues that might prejudice
a defendant. Id. at 143-44. For example, a battered woman accused of killing her husband
might strike, for cause, a juror expressing the belief that any woman choosing to remain in
an abusive relationship deserves what she gets.
83. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
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infect the entire proceedings."' Rather than focusing on fairness for
a criminal defendant, the Court in J.E.B. seemed more concerned
with the rights of jurors who might be removed from the jury pool
on the basis of gender, noting that "individual jurors .. have a
right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures."85 The Court
also stated that a litigant's assumption that jurors hold certain
views because of their gender "denigrates [their] dignity."86 Finally,
in Part V of the opinion, which summarized the ruling and con-
cluded the decision, the Court emphasized only the importance of
affording all citizens an equal opportunity to participate in the
justice system:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of
justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only
furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of
equality under the law - that all citizens, regardless of race,
ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our
democracy. When persons are excluded from participation in
our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial
system is jeopardized. 7
Interestingly, the Court made no mention of how a defendant's right
to a fair and impartial jury might be compromised through the use
of gender-based peremptory challenges.88
2. J.E.B.: Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor wrote a forceful concurrence in J.E.B., noting
that the outcome of the case "is not costless." 9 Criticizing the
majority on two grounds, Justice O'Connor argued that criminal
defendants warrant special protection in the justice system,
entitling them to privileges the prosecution might not be granted.9"
Justice O'Connor also argued that decisions by male and female
jurors are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including
84. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cites a case stating that "discrimination
within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted
there." Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991)).
85. Id. at 140-41.
86. Id. at 142.
87. Id. at 145-46 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 150-51.
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their gender.91 Consequently, Justice O'Connor would have limited
the holding in J.E.B. to disallowing the government's use of gender-
based peremptory challenges, leaving criminal defendants free to
strike jurors on the basis of gender.9 2
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the government from striking a juror
solely on the basis of his or her gender.93 She disagreed, however,
with the majority's analysis when she stated that "[t]he Equal
Protection Clause prohibits only discrimination by state actors. 94
Because criminal defendants are not state actors and the peremp-
tory challenge remains an important right to an accused defendant,
Justice O'Connor opposed limiting a defendant's use of gender-based
peremptory challenges.95
In another departure from the majority's reasoning, Justice
O'Connor noted that 'like race, gender matters."9 After citing
social science studies finding gender differences in juror's attitudes
in rape cases, Justice O'Connor articulated a common-sense view of
how gender might affect a juror's behavior:
[O]ne need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain
cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be
relevant to his or her view of the case .... Individuals are not
expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men - or
women. Today's decision severely limits a litigant's ability to act
on this intuition, for the import of our holding is that any
correlation between a juror's gender and attitudes is irrelevant
as a matter of constitutional law. But to say that gender makes
91. Id. at 149.
92. Id. at 151 (stating "that the Equal Protection Clause does not limit the exercise of
peremptory challenges by private civil litigants and criminal defendants"). With respect to
gender, Justice O'Connor did not require a particularized showing that gender issues would
be crucial to the defense of the accused. Id. Nonetheless, Justice O'Conor did mention the
example of a battered woman, on trial for murdering her husband, as a particularly
compelling instance where gender-based peremptory challenges should be allowed. Id. This
example suggests that Justice O'Connor's argument may have more significance in trials
where gender issues play a pivotal role in the jurors' consideration of the case. Id.
93. Id. at 146.
94. Id. at 150.
95. Id. Justice O'Connor also stated that "[the Court] made the mistake of concluding that
private civil litigants are state actors when they [were] exercis[ing] peremptory challenges,"
and in extending that reasoning to the use of peremptory challenges by criminal defendants.
Id. She concluded that "[the Court] should not ... forget that not all that occurs in the
courtroom is state action. Private civil litigants are just that - private litigants." Id.
96. Id. at 148.
97. Id. at 149 (citing REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140-41 (1983)).
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no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes
no difference as a matter of fact.9"
With this reasoning, Justice O'Connor strengthened her conclusion
that criminal defendants should be allowed to use gender-based
peremptory strikes because gender-based assumptions about juror
attitudes are "sometimes accurate."9 In a pointed conclusion to her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor imagined one scenario where the
holding of J.E.B. might harm a criminal defendant:
Will we, in the name of fighting gender discrimination, hold that
the battered wife - on trial for wounding her abusive husband
- is a state actor? Will we preclude her from using her peremp-
tory challenges to ensure that the jury of her peers contains as
many women members as possible? I assume we will, but I
hope we will not."°
Like Justice O'Connor, this article argues that the Court's
emphasis in J.E.B. on the rights of the juror, and its relative silence
on the rights of the defendant, is misplaced. Ironically, the Court
invoked Taylor v. Louisiana to support the proposition that women
had been unfairly excluded from juries, but it notes only in passing
that Taylor involved a Sixth Amendment challenge, brought by a
defendant, to Louisiana's statutory scheme for jury selection.''
The holding in Taylor was thus used as precedent that guided the
Court's decision in J.E.B., but J.E.B. addresses none of the Sixth
Amendment concerns that informed the Court's decision in Taylor."°2
Ultimately, this article asserts that any analysis concerning the use
of peremptory strikes should focus on the rights of the defendant and
the harm incurred by a defendant if the prosecution uses peremptory
challenges improperly. In grounding its decision on an equal protec-
tion analysis with respect to harm to potential jurors, the majority in
J.E.B. omitted an important point and did little to advance the
understanding of how gender differences affect conceptions of the
right to a fair and an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.
J.E.B. is also noteworthy for its characterization of the differ-
ences between male and female jurors. In its review of previous
decisions regarding gender and jury selection, the Court quoted the
famous passage from Ballard v. United States stating that "the two
98. Id.
99. Id. at 150.
100. Id. at 151.
101. See id. at 135; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523 (1975).
102. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135.
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sexes are not fungible."'10' Indeed, the earliest arguments promoting
jury service for women were premised on the notion that women, as
a gender class, have something to offer that is different from what
men bring to the jury room. 10 4 The Court in J.E.B. suggested, how-
ever, that any assumption about juror behavior, based on the fact
that the two sexes are not fungible, constitutes an invidious stereo-
type in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.15 In this manner,
the analysis in J.E.B. completed the shift in rhetoric begun in Taylor,
moving from an argument characterizing gender as a unique voice
in Ballard, to one characterizing any distinction between the genders
as discrimination in J.E.B.
D. Responses to J.E.B.
Although support for the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. has
been widespread,"' other scholars have criticized the decision for
failing to recognize which gender actually is harmed through the
use of gender-based peremptory challenges.0 7 For example, Karen
L. Cipriani performed an empirical study of the District of Columbia
Circuit jury pool from January to June of 1993.108 From a sample of
4302 people called for jury service, Cipriani found that the govern-
ment or the defense struck thirty percent of women with peremptory
strikes, while thirty-seven percent of the men were peremptorily
stricken."°9 Based on the sample, prospective female jurors had a
higher chance of being seated on the jury than men who were more
likely to be struck on the basis of a peremptory challenge." 0
Although Cipriani concedes that the data cannot conclusively
indicate whether the peremptory strikes were exercised based on
gender, she notes that "this data . . . does belie the belief that
women jurors are excused disproportionately.""' The study "calls
into question the traditional dogma that female jurors are vulnera-
ble and male jurors are privileged.""' 2
Certainly generalizations cannot, and should not, be made about
the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of one small study in one
103. Id. at 133 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
104. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
105. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 133-36.
106. See, e.g., Karen L. Cipriani, Note, The Numbers Don't Add Up: Challenging the
Premise of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1994).
107. See id. at 1261-64.
108. Id. at 1265.
109. Id. at 1265, 1267.
110. Id. at 1265-67.
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id. at 1268.
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judicial district. Cipriani's findings, however, prompt reconsidera-
tion of the assumption that gender-based peremptory strikes will be
exercised in a manner that excludes women from jury service.
Additionally, as Cipriani notes at the end of her article,
the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. "may not be an appropriate
or effective way to redress a prior history of discrimination." '113
Although the Court ultimately decided J.E.B. on equal protection
grounds, the majority's lengthy -discussion of women's historical
exclusion from jury service suggests that its decision was also
motivated by a fear that gender-based peremptory strikes disadvan-
tage female jurors." 4 Clearly, as Cipriani's research suggests, more
empirical research should-be done to determine whether the Court's
assumption in J.E.B. is accurate.
Another critique of J.E.B. emphasizes the cost of the decision to
female litigants who might need to use gender-based peremptory
strikes to secure their right to a jury of their peers." 5 Noting that
the Court in J.E.B. overlooked crucial differences between male and
female jurors, Roberta Flowers suggests that the decision sacrificed
the right of the litigant to determine who sits on the jury in favor of
elevating the rights of the jurors themselves." 6 Contrary to the
majority's analysis in J.E.B., litigants are not hurt by. the use of
gender-based peremptory strikes if they are using those challenges
in a manner they believe necessary to obtain a fair trial."7 Further-
more, Flowers alleges that voir dire is an inadequate substitute for
the peremptory challenge because it fails to uncover the subtle,
gender-based cognitive differences that the social sciences have
discovered."' In a statement echoing Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, Flowers ends her analysis of J.E.B. by stating that "the
effect of this decision must be assessed in terms of the cost to female
litigants and victims.""9 Flowers also suggests that, rather than
protecting the rights of female litigants, J.E.B. eliminates them. 20
113. Id. at 1277. Cipriani also writes in a footnote that Justice Scalia made this precise
point in his dissent in J.E.B. when he stated that women are stricken by peremptory
challenges not because of doubts regarding their competence, but "because of doubt that they
are well disposed to the striking party's case." Id. at 1277 n.113 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama,
511 U.S. 127, 160 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
114. See id. at 1253-54.
115. See Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A "Difference" Look at J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 491, 532-33 (1995).
116. See id. at 529-30.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 530.
119. Id. at 532.
120. Id.
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II. CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
As described above in Part I, the issue of women's jury service
in the United States has always involved the question of whether
women bring a unique perspective to the jury box. Early proponents
of jury service for women grounded their argument upon the notion
that a valuable perspective would be missing if women continued
to be excluded.'21 The more recent rhetoric, however, most notably
in the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama, seemingly
denies the possibility that men and women might think differently
about important moral and legal questions. 22 Given the historical
tendency to label women's perceived 'differences' as inferior when
compared to a male standard, this position is understandable.
123
Social science research, however, indicates that this argument is
simply not supported by the reality of differences between men and
women's cognitive processes.'24
A. Carol Gilligan: Gender and Moral Reasoning
Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice,'25 contributes signifi-
cantly to psychologists' understanding of gender differences in moral
reasoning. As Gilligan notes in the beginning of her book, previous
studies of moral reasoning had implicitly adopted the male experi-
ence of moral thinking as the norm, ignoring the experiences of
women or labeling such experiences as deviant because they did not
match the research done on men.'26 For example, Sigmund Freud
believed that women's superego, the part of the brain responsible for
moral reasoning, was less developed than men's, and that women
accordingly exhibit less of a sense of justice.'27 Another psychologist,
Erik Erikson, "turns repeatedly to the lives of men" in his analysis
of human development across the life span. 12 Finally, even
Lawrence Kohlberg, arguably the foremost scholar on moral
development, based his formulation of the six stages that illustrate
the development of moral judgment entirely upon an empirical
121. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 71.
122. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1994).
123. See, e.g., id. at 139 n.11, 142.
124. See, e.g., id. at 138 n.9.
125. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
126. See id. at 2, 6.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id. at 107.
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study of eighty-four boys whose development he followed over the
course of twenty years.129
Gilligan's book fills the void left by these scholars by analyzing
the results of three different studies regarding women and moral
thinking.13 ° In the first study, male and female college students
were selected at random from a group of students who studied moral
and political choice. 3' Interviewers questioned these students
when they were seniors in college and again five years later about
their view of self and thoughts regarding morality when presented
with moral conflicts and life choices.3 2
The second study in Gilligan's book examines the role of conflict
in the development of women considering having an abortion. 3
Researchers interviewed women who were considering an abortion
during their first trimester of pregnancy and contacted them again
one year later.' Finally, the third study, labeled the "rights and
responsibilities study," matched men and women for age, intelli-
gence, education, occupation, and social class at nine points across
the life cycle. 135 The participants were interviewed about their
conceptions of self and morality, their experiences of moral conflict
and choice, and their resolutions of hypothetical moral dilemmas. 36
In her rights and responsibilities study, Gilligan used a hypo-
thetical dilemma constructed by Kohlberg to assess differences in
the moral development of male and female participants.137 The
hypothetical situation, called 'Heinz's dilemma,' involves a man,
Heinz, whose wife is fatally ill, but who cannot afford to buy a drug
to save her life. 38 The standard format of Kohlberg's interview
technique requires a participant to decide, after being told that the
pharmacist refuses to lower the price of the medicine, whether
Heinz should steal the drug.139 Two eleven-year-old participants in
the study, Amy and Jake, illustrate Gilligan's conclusion about
gender differences in moral thinking. 40 Gilligan writes that "[Amy
and Jake] see, in the same dilemma, two very different moral
problems. Though current theory brightly illuminates the line and
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 2-3.
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id.




137. Id. at 25.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 25-26.
140. Id. at 32.
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the logic of the boy's thought, it casts scant light on that of the
girl.'' 1
When asked whether Heinz should steal the drug, Jake
constructs the dilemma, as Kohlberg did, as a struggle between the
values of life and property.'42 Jake decides that life has logical
priority over property and uses that logic to defend his judgment
that Heinz should steal the medicine.'43 The interviewer also asks
Jake about the consequences of breaking the law.'44 Jake states that
'laws have mistakes," and "[the judge] should give Heinz the
lightest possible sentence" because the judge would probably
consider Heinz's actions "the right thing to do."'45 Jake's view that
Heinz should steal the drug, despite a law prohibiting theft, and his
assumption that the judge would agree with Heinz, manifests his
understanding that there is a social consensus about the "right
thing to do" in that situation. 14 Jake's ability to use deductive logic
in reasoning about a moral dilemma, his differentiation of morality
from law, and his understanding that laws are subject to error and
change all illustrate movement toward Kohlberg's definition of a
principled conception of justice.147
In contrast to Jake, who contrues Heinz's dilemma as a
hierarchy of rights, Amy sees the situation as "a narrative of
relationships that extends over time."'48 When asked whether Heinz
should steal the drug, Amy considers the effect of the theft on the
relationship between Heinz and his wife, reasoning that his wife
might become more gravely ill if Heinz were thrown in jail and
unable to care for her.149 Amy, therefore, suggests that Heinz and
his wife discuss ways to obtain money or communicate with the
druggist and explain the importance of the medicine." ° Instead of
a conflict between life and property, Amy sees "a world comprised
of relationships.., that coheres through human connection rather
than through systems of rules, [and] she finds the puzzle in the
dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to respond to the
wife.""'
141. Id. at 25.





147. Id. at 27.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 28-29.
151. Id. at 29.
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As demonstrated, Amy and Jake exhibit two different kinds of
moral understanding.112 Jake responds to Heinz's dilemma by
articulating a hierarchy of values while Amy advocates commu-
nication to sustain "a web of relationships" between Heinz, his wife,
and the druggist.'53 Gilligan's analysis notes that these two modes
of moral understanding are complementary, rather than opposi-
tional.' Given this complementary construction of differences,
Gilligan questions the bias of traditional theory, which orders
gender differences in a hierarchy that prefers Jake's principled logic
over Amy's network of human connection.'
Gilligan's study of women contemplating abortion provides
further support for the gender differences exemplified in Amy and
Jake's moral thinking. Based upon women's responses regarding
their choice to obtain an abortion, Gilligan discovered "the centrality
of the concepts of responsibility and care in women's constructions
of the moral domain, [as well as] the close tie in women's thinking
between conceptions of the self and of morality."'56 The women
Gilligan interviewed equated concerns regarding their individual
survival (i.e., a feeling that, because of adverse life circumstances,
these women could not simultaneously have a baby and ensure their
own survival) with selfishness, while emphasizing "the 'responsi-
bility' of a life lived in relationships."'57 Gilligan notes that many
of these women confused responsibility "with a [blind] responsive-
ness to others that impedes a recognition of self."'58 Founded upon
a sense of responsibilities to others in their network of relationships,
the conception of morality of many of the women in Gilligan's
abortion study voiced a denial of self.'59
Ultimately, Gilligan emphasizes the importance of recognizing
that two different modes of moral reasoning exist. 6 ° A danger of
miscommunication between the sexes arises because "men and
women .. .speak different languages that they assume are the
same, using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self
and social relationships."'' Understanding the different moral
perspectives of men and women addresses this communication
problem, minimizing the likelihood that there will be "systematic
152. Id. at 32.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 33.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 105.
157. Id. at 127.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 173.
161. Id.
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mistranslation" in communications between the sexes.'62 Ulti-
mately, Gilligan argues, these two different modes of moral
reasoning, while distinct, are connected as two parts of a complex
understanding of human experience.163 She writes:
While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality
- that everyone should be treated the same - an ethic of care
rests on the premise of nonviolence - that no one should be
hurt. In the representation of maturity, both perspectives
converge in the realization that just as inequality adversely
affects both parties in an unequal relationship, so too violence is
destructive for everyone involved. The dialogue between fairness
and care not only provides a better understanding of relations
between the sexes but also gives rise to a more comprehensive
portrayal of adult work and family relationships."M
Gilligan's theory is relevant to a discussion of gender and jury
dynamics. If men and women use different methods of moral
reasoning, they should bring these differences into the jury room
and use distinct modes of thinking to decide upon a verdict.
For example, based on Gilligan's work, one might hypothesize
that men tend to view crimes in the context of hierarchies of princi-
ples, while women tend to examine crimes within a broader context
of human relationships. Crucial to the ultimate question of the guilt
or innocence of the accused, perhaps, is the question of gender
composition's influence on a jury's verdict. Although no one has
empirically tested Gilligan's theory with respect to jury dynamics, 165
other social science scholarship has considered whether jurors'
gender affects their behavior during their jury service.
B. Other Social Science Research
Social science research on jury behavior supports the hypothesis
that gender affects the outcome of jury verdicts. Many researchers
have utilized mock trial experiments to test the effect of certain
variables on verdict outcomes. For example, one study found that
mock jurors favored same-sex defendants in their judgments of
whether a defendant murdered his or her spouse."' The mock jurors
162. Id.
163. See id. at 173-74.
164. Id. at 174.
165. Forman, supra note 6, at 51 ("[N]o one has tested the applicability of Gilligan's theory
to the jury process."); Flowers, supra note 115, at 520 ("[N]o studies have specifically tested
the applicability of Gilligan's theory to the jury process.").
166. See Cookie Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOL. 305, 308 (1974).
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also revealed attitudes that seem to substantiate Gilligan's theory
regarding the differential thought processes of men and women. For
example, female jurors reported feeling more empathy for the
defendant than male jurors, and female jurors were more likely to
mention that the defendant should receive psychiatric care.'67 These
results are consistent with Gilligan's conclusion that women are
more likely to consider the network of human relationships in their
judgments of moral or, in this case, legal problems.'68 Additionally,
men perceived the defendant as somewhat more evil than the
women did.'69 Again, Gilligan's research would predict this outcome:
Because men tend to organize their thinking in terms of a hierarchy
of rights, men, understandably, would be more likely than women
to state that a defendant, accused of violating the order of civil and
legal rights by killing another person, is evil.
Perhaps because of the gendered nature of the crime, rape cases
have been a particular focus of research about gender and jury
verdicts. 7 0 Indeed, possibly the "safest generalization" about gender
differences is that women are more likely than men to find the
defendant guilty in a rape case.171 In several experiments asking
jurors to render decisions in a hypothetical rape trial, women were
more likely than men to find the defendant guilty." 2 Women have
also suggested longer sentences for rape defendants than men, and
women expressed greater certainty about their verdicts in rape
cases.' 73 One obvious explanation for these results is that women
tend to identify with the female rape victim, leading them to judge
the alleged attacker more harshly.174 Similarly, men may be reluc-
tant to pronounce a verdict of guilty on a defendant who, like
167. See id. at 309.
168. See GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 29.
169. Stephan, supra note 166, at 309.
170. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 141 (1983).
171. See id. at 141.
172. See James H. Davis et al., Victim Consequences, Sentence Severity, and Decision
Processes in Mock Juries, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 346,354 (1977);
Gloria J. Fischer, Gender Effects on Individual Verdicts and on Mock Jury Verdicts in a
Simulated Acquaintance Rape Trial, 36 SEx ROLES 491, 496 (1997); Norbert L. Kerr et al.,
Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule
on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 282, 290 (1976);
Michael G. Rumsey & Judith M. Rumsey, A Case of Rape: Sentencing Judgments of Males
and Females, 41 PSYCHOL. REP. 459, 462 (1977).
173. See Kathleen McNamara et al., Verdict, Sentencing, and Certainty as a Function of Sex
of Juror and Amount of Evidence in a Simulated Rape Trial, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 575, 579
(1993). But see Rumsey & Rumsey, supra note 172, at 462 (finding no gender difference in
length of suggested sentences for rape defendants in a mock trial scenario).
174. See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 173, at 582.
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themselves, is male.175 Another explanation may be that men and
women have opposite defensive reactions to rape, particularly when
the evidence is ambiguous. 176 Men exculpate defendants by shifting
blame to the victim, while women are reluctant to moderate their
judgment of the defendant's guilt. 77
Several articles describe subtler gender differences in juror
decisions about rape cases. For example, one study found that
females, more than males, shifted in their assessment of the
defendant's guilt, when their judgment was recorded before and
after group deliberation. 7 1 Another experiment reported significant
gender differences when jurors were asked to judge guilt individu-
ally, but the same jurors, deliberating in groups, were significantly
more likely to render a guilty verdict only when the number of
females on the jury approached an overwhelming majority (i.e., ten
female jurors out of twelve). 79 Consequently, differences in
individual male and female verdict preferences may not always be
predictive of verdict outcomes when those same jurors deliberate in
groups.18 ° These results suggest a need for further research to
determine whether men or women are more likely to change their
initial assessment of guilt following discussions with fellow jurors.
Because female jurors participate at lower rates than male jurors in
group deliberations, 8' this shift in judgment possibly occurs in part
because women's views are not discussed adequately in the jury
room.
Like rape trials, murder trials involving a defense of battered
woman syndrome have a highly gendered component. Indeed, one
study reports that female jurors viewed more favorably than male
jurors a defense of battered woman syndrome in a hypothetical trial
175. At least one study has found that both men and women tend to be less likely to find
a defendant of their sex guilty than they are to find a defendant of the opposite sex guilty.
Stephan, supra note 166, at 308. Although Stephan's experiment involved a hypothetical
murder case, common sense suggests that this tendency may be a factor in jury decisions for
other crimes as well. Other research, however, suggests that this theory of same-sex
identification cannot adequately explain all juror decisions. See, e.g., Cathaleene Jones &
Elliot Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the
Victim, 26 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 415, 418 (1973) (finding no sex differences in the
attribution of fault to a female rape victim).
176. See Rumsey & Rumsey, supra note 172, at 464.
177. See id. Rumsey and Rumsey state that subjective factors, such as the extent that a
juror reacts defensively to a hypothetical situation or identifies with a same-sex victim,
become more significant in a juror's decision-making process when the evidence is incon-
clusive. Id.
178. See Davis et al., supra note 172, at 359.
179. See Fischer, supra note 172, at 496.
180. See id.
181. See infra Part II.C.
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of a woman who killed her allegedly abusive husband.1 2 With the
exception of the jurors' recommendations regarding punishment,
this gender difference was mediated by the influence of gender on
the jurors' pre-existing beliefs about spousal abuse.' Thus, the
gender difference in verdict outcome appeared not because of gender
per se, but rather because women were more likely than men to hold
favorable beliefs about the defense of battered woman syndrome
prior to the simulated trial."l ' This evidence regarding battered
woman syndrome is particularly important given Justice O'Connor's
comment in her concurrence to J.E.B. v. Alabama that a woman
using battered woman syndrome as a defense to a murder charge
may have a legitimate reason to strike potential jurors solely on the
basis of their gender.'85
Other studies have addressed specific factors that produce
gender differences in verdict outcomes. For example, one study
found that women were more likely than men to find a defendant
accused of rape and murder guilty if the women had been exposed
to "high-heinous" publicity that dramatized the violent nature of
the crime.'86 Women were also more likely to vote guilty if they
had been exposed to "high-prejudgment" pre-trial publicity, which
strongly suggested that the particular defendant had committed
the act, but this effect was significant only for women with a low
IQ. '7 The authors discuss several explanations for these gender
differences. 88 Prior to the study, they hypothesized that women
might be more vulnerable to pre-trial publicity because they would
identify with the victim more than men.8 9 Contrary to this expecta-
tion, however, women actually identified with the victim less than
men did."9 The authors also cite several studies suggesting that
women may be generally more susceptible to social influences than
182. See Regina A. Schuller et al., Jurors'Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who Kill:
The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 316, 332 (1994).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
186. See Bruce C. Hoiberg & Lloyd K. Stires, The Effect of Several Types of Pretrial
Publicity on the Guilt Attributions of Simulated Jurors, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 269,
271 (1973). The term "high-heinous" refers to "the degree to which [the publicity] contained
lurid descriptions of the crime." Id. at 269.
187. Id. at 271.
188. Id. at 272-74.
189. Id. at 268.
190. Id. at 272. The authors speculate that this result can be explained by the fact that
women, assumed to be more vulnerable to crime than men, may feel a greater need to
differentiate themselves from the victim. Id. at 273. Additionally, women's need to believe in
a "just world" may lead them to derogate the victim so they can conclude that "tragedies like
that may happen to bad girls like her, but not to (good) persons like me." Id.
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men.'91 Finally, they hypothesized that men may have been less
affected by the publicity because they perceived it as manipulative
and reacted unfavorably to it.
192
Numerous articles in journals of social psychology examine the
effect of a defendant's attractiveness on verdict outcome and sen-
tencing recommendations. 193 Here, too, researchers have found
gender differences.' 94 In one study, mean sentences suggested by
male jurors decreased from 3.24 to .95 years in prison, on a scale of
zero to seven, depending on whether the male defendant was
considered attractive.' 5 Conversely, mean sentences given by
female jurors remained unchanged, at 2.90 years, by the factor of
the defendant's attractiveness.'96 A similar result was obtained in
another experiment; men's evaluations of guilt and sentencing
recommendations were significantly less punitive when they were
asked to recommend sentences for attractive female defendants.'97
Again, the level of the defendant's attractiveness did not have a
significant effect on the sentencing recommendations made by
women in the study. 98 An intuitive explanation for these results is
that males are simply more responsive to physical attractiveness
than females.' 99
Gender differences have also been discovered in mock juries for
civil trials. °° In one experiment, the superior status litigant won
seventy-four percent of the cases tried before of an all-male jury,
and only fifty percent of the cases before a mixed gender jury.2"' The
author of this study hypothesized that women might favor inferior
191. Id. at 274.
192. Id. The authors do not cite authority indicating that men may be more likely than
women to view publicity as manipulative. They do, however, state that the male gender of the
defendant may have made male jurors more sensitive to the potentially prejudicial effects of
publicity on their attributions of guilt. Id.
193. E.g., David B. Gray & Richard D. Ashmore, Biasing Influence of Defendants'
Characteristics on Simulated Sentencing, 38 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 727, 732 (1976).
194. E.g., id.
195. Id. at 732.
196. Id.
197. See Michael G. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt,
Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task,
8 J. RES. PERSONALITY 45, 50-51 (1974).
198. Id. at 50.
199. Id.
200. See Eloise C. Snyder, Sex Role Differential and Juror Decisions, 55 SOC. & SOC. RES.
442 (1971). Although Snyder's article examines only the results of actual civil trials, not
criminal trials, the gender differences Snyder describes are relevant in the criminal context
as well. For example, if, as Snyder states, women are more likely to favor the inferior status
litigant, women may be more likely to favor a defendant whom they perceive as socially
disadvantaged.
201. Id. at 444.
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status litigants because, like a minority group, they are more likely
than men to identify with those who belong to minority groups." 2 In
contrast, women have not been found to reward inferior status
litigants with increased damages; at least two studies found that
women award less money than men.20 3 One explanation for women's
reluctance to award damages is the "rigidly conservative economic
positions" that they have historically maintained, despite their
traditional affiliation with the underdog.
2 4
In another study, women were more likely to vote for the
plaintiff in various scenarios taken from actual sexual harassment
cases, regardless of whether the behavior in question was perceived
as innocuous, ambiguous, or severe. 2 5 Gender alone, however, did
not affect the award of damages in the same experiment; only those
jurors who had been victims of sexual harassment were likely to
award the plaintiff increased money damages.0 6 Because female
participants were more likely to report having been sexually
harassed,0 7 the result is that women, on average, award more
money to sexual harassment plaintiffs than men.208 This result is
caused directly by previous experience with sexual harassment and
only indirectly by gender.20 9
On the other hand, some research finds no support for the idea
that males and females behave differently as jurors. One study of
mock jurors, whose participants were undergraduate psychology
students, concluded that men and women did not differ in their
verdicts for a murder case, nor in their beliefs about actual guilt or
innocence of defendant.210 Similarly, Inside the Jury cites several
other studies that found no difference between male and female
verdict preferences.21' British researchers have also concluded,
based on data from actual jury outcomes, that "as a rule, the
202. Id. at 447.
203. See id. at 446; Cookie Stephan & Judy Corder Tully, The Influence of Physical
Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149,
150 (1977).
204. Snyder, supra note 200, at 446.
205. Mary A. Gowan & Raymond A. Zimmermann, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and
Previous Experience on Juror Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 596, 613 (1996).
206. Id.
207. Specifically, 54% of Hispanic females, 56% of Caucasian females, 16% of Hispanic
males, and 17% of Caucasian males participating in the study indicated that they had been
victims of sexual harassment. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Charlan Nemeth et al., From the '50s to the '70s: Women in Jury Deliberations, 39
SOCIOMETRY 293, 296-97 (1976).
211. HASTIE ETAL., supra note 170, at 140.
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presence of women in any numbers is not likely, per se, to change
the nature of the verdict returned. 212
C. Women's Participation in Jury Deliberations
Research about the effect of gender on individual verdict
preferences is revealing, but a jury .verdict is not the sum of
individual verdict preferences; rather, it is the product of a group
deliberation process. 21" Therefore, information about male and
female rates of participation in the jury room is crucial to under-
standing how gender affects verdict outcomes. In an early study of
mock jury deliberations, researchers at the University of Chicago
Law School discovered "a continuance in jury deliberations of [the]
sex role specialization observed in adult family behavior."2"4 Their
data revealed that men "pro-act" by initiating "relatively long
bursts of acts directed at the solution of the task problem," while
women display a tendency to react to the contributions of others." 5
Specifically, men exceeded women in the "attempted answers"
categories of giving suggestions, opinions, or orientations, while
women exceeded men in the "positive reactions" categories of
showing solidarity, tension release, or agreement.216 The authors
conclude that sex-role differentiation can be reliably demonstrated
in jury deliberations." 7 Dating from 1956, this study could be
criticized because the authors began their research with the
hypothesis that jurors would display traditional sex roles in the jury
room, as they do within their family interactions.21 Therefore, their
scorers, particularly considering the strong gender. roles charac-
teristic of the 1950s culture, may have been predisposed to observe
the sex-typed behaviors that the researchers assumed they would
find.
A more recent study notes that the role of women has changed
considerably since 1956 and questions the interpretations of
Strodtbeck and Mann, finding significant gender differences in juror
212. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL McCoNvILLE, JURY TRIALS 101 (1979). Baldwin and
McConville found, based on jury trials in Birmingham, England, that the acquittal rate for
cases where four or more women were on the jury "corresponds pretty well exactly to the city
average." Id.
213. See Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593,
594 (1987).
214. Fred L. Strodtbeck & Richard D. Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations,
19 SOCIOMETRY 3, 8 (1956).
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 7-8.
217. Id. at 11.
218. Id. at 4.
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behavior.219 The results of this study revealed that men were more
likely to take a position at the head or foot of the table in the
deliberation room."22 Additionally, men tended to communicate more
frequently than women and were the target of more communications
from others.221 The authors also discovered gender differences in the
way jurors perceived their fellow jurors.222 Men were rated higher
than women on the following adjectives: intelligent, influential,
independent, confident, rational, strong, courageous, aggressive,
active, and persistent.223 The men were also seen more as leaders,
while the women were better liked.224 Finally, researchers found no
gender differences in juror reports of the adjectives: good, honest,
friendly, tolerant, consistent, or trustworthy.225 Interestingly, men
were rated as possessing more characteristics traditionally associ-
ated with the law and legal actors, including intelligence, influence,
leadership, and rationality.226 The authors noted that the gender
differences reflected in their results "make clear that [their] subjects,
much like the folklore of attorneys, tended to assume that women
are relatively more passive, weak and non-influential." '227
Hastie et al. report similar differences regarding the participa-
tion of men and women in their mock jury study.228 For example,
male jurors, on average, made forty percent more remarks than
female jurors during deliberations.22 9 Men and women also differed
regarding the substance of their comments.230 Men made more
references to case facts, legal issues, disputed key facts, and organi-
zational matters, while women made more verdict statements and
statements irrelevant to the case.231 The authors of this study
caution, however, that these differences should not be ascribed
solely to gender, without further analysis, because the jurors
differed in other areas, including education, occupation, and
experience in decision-making contexts.232
219. Nemeth, supra note 210, at 294, 296.
220. Id. at 296.
221. Id. at 297.
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Based upon this evidence of women's relative silence in jury
deliberations, it appears likely that many juries render a verdict
without the equal participation of male and female jurors. As
research has shown, "the domination of a few and the silence of
others increase the likelihood of erroneous group decisions." '233
Although some jurors, for various reasons, likely will not actively
participate in deliberations, the danger of reaching erroneous
verdicts probably increases when a certain class of society consis-
tently remains silent in the jury room. Indeed, ensuring that jury
discussions are truly "group" deliberations means that "[w]omen
need to speak more and men need to listen more."2 4
D. Implications of the Research
The social science research described above has many implica-
tions for theories about juries. The importance of this research,
however, lies in an evaluation of its ability to predict actual jury
deliberations. Next, consideration is warranted regarding how a
theory proposing that women bring a unique and distinct voice to
the jury box can be reconciled with the ideal of equality between the
sexes.
1. Assessment of the Research
Most of the studies cited above can be criticized on predictable
grounds. These studies, performed mostly by psychologists and
sociologists, did not target the attitudes and decisions of actual
jurors.235 Rather, the vast majority of these studies used college
students as subjects.236 Clearly, college students do not form the
exclusive population from which jury venires are drawn. Conse-
quently, the findings of psychologists regarding juror decisions in
mock trials can be generalized to actual jury behavior only if college
students are sufficiently representative of the larger population.
Although the representativeness of the samples used in these
233. Marder, supra note 213, at 600.
234. Id. at 599.
235. But see Snyder, supra note 200, at 443 (using actual jurors).
236. Of the nearly twenty psychological studies cited in this paper, only five appear to have
used subjects that were not college students. See Gowan & Zimmermann, supra note 205, at
602 (using individuals called for jury duty, students in business law or human resources
management courses, and friends and relatives); Gray & Ashmore, supra note 193, at 729
(using senior citizens and members of a lay religious service group); Hoiberg & Stires, supra
note 186, at 268 (using high school students); Snyder, supra note 200, at 443 (using actual
jurors); and Strodtbeck & Mann, supra note 214, at 4 (using a range of individuals fully
established in their sex and occupational roles).
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studies may be questioned, psychologists have relied extensively on
similar research, drawing exclusively on college students as
subjects. Additionally, this problem of representativeness would be
more compelling if the five studies using non-college students as
subjects had reported results that markedly differed from the other
studies. To the contrary, all five studies found gender differences in
jury decisions or style of deliberations, suggesting that college
students are not unique in their manifestations of gender differ-
ences as jurors.28 7
Another concern about drawing generalizations from these
findings is that individuals may behave differently when they are
actual jurors, whose determinations carry greater legal and social
significance, than when they are mock jurors in an elaborately
designed experiment. This shortcoming, however, is applicable to
most social science research. This criticism notwithstanding, the
findings of psychologists regarding juror behavior should be
accepted as the best current approximation of juror attitudes and
decisions, or, at least, the best alternative to recording actual jury
deliberations, a practice that is not permissible because it raises
other concerns. 23" Furthermore, regardless of whether the results of
the social scientists are accurate in every case confronting an
attorney at trial, their research provides valuable insight into juror
behavior based upon mock jurors' behavior in similar situations.
Moreover, the gender differences found in these studies are
more significant because the gender differences were found in so
many different aspects of juror decision-making and deliberative
behavior. Although common sense might predict gender differences
in trials of cases where gender is a prominent issue, such as rape
cases, numerous studies have found that male and female jurors
respond differently in other contexts as well.23 9 These results became
even more compelling when considered in light of the evidence
compiled by psychologists, such as Carol Gilligan.24 ° Because men
and women approach moral dilemmas differently and do not always
share the same conception of justice,24 1 a hypothesis that male and
237. For the conclusions reached in these five studies, that gender differences exist in juror
behavior, see Gowan & Zimmermann, supra note 205, at 611, 613; Gray & Ashmore, supra
note 193, at 732; Hoiberg & Stires, supra note 186, at 271-72; Snyder, supra note 200, at 446;
and Strodtbeck & Mann, supra note 214, at 7-8.
238. See, e.g., Abraham Abromovshy & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room:
An Unnecessary and Dangerous Precendent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865 (1996).
239. For a more extensive discussion of these studies, particularly those that did not
involve juror decisions about rape trials, see supra Part II.B-C.
240. For an explanation of Gilligan's theories regarding gender and moral reasoning, see
supra Part II.A.
241. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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female jurors might think differently about the same body of
evidence in a criminal trial is reasonable. Indeed, consideration of
Gilligan's theory in conjunction with the mock jury studies is
crucial; Gilligan provides a cognitive and psychological explanation
for why gender differences might exist in juror decisions,242 sup-
ported by the empirical evidence presented in the mock jury studies.
Taken together, these two bodies of research provide powerful
support for the conclusion that gender plays a significant role in the
decisions that jurors make in actual criminal cases.
2. Distinctiveness Versus Equality
The observation that jurors, tend to make different decisions in
the courtroom depending upon their gender24 has a puzzling impact
on the issue of gender equality in the legal system. If women do,
indeed, bring a unique voice to the jury room, contributing a
different perspective from the insight offered by men, this distinc-
tiveness may affect the attempt to achieve ideal equality between
men and women. The notion that women bring distinctiveness into
the courtroom is difficult to reconcile with the goal of achieving
gender equality. In considering this issue, an examination of the
differences between the two traditionally competing strains of
feminist legal theory is helpful.
Liberal feminists adopt perhaps the most intuitive understand-
ing of feminism: They believe that men and women should be
treated alike and that all gender-based classifications are imper-
missible.244 This reasoning appeared to underlie the Supreme
Court's decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama, in which the Court ruled that
gender-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional because
they require classifying jurors on the basis of their gender.245 In its
decision, the Court disavowed the idea that any predictable differ-
ences exist in decisions made by male and female jurors.246 This
rationale is consistent with the philosophy of liberal feminism.
Liberal feminists argue that men and women should be treated
equally in all respects, and therefore, they believe that no principled
reason exists to distinguish between the sexes when exercising
peremptory challenges. 47
242. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. E.g., Cipriani, supra note 106, at 1268-69.
245. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
247. See Cipriani, supra note 106, at 1269.
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Cultural feminists, on the other hand, argue that gender
differences do exist and that "these differences must be acknowl-
edged and embraced.... [in] recognition of the unique contributions
women make to the social and legal world." '248 Cultural feminists,
such as Carol Gilligan, believe that women speak in a voice that
is distinct from that of men and advocate for greater acceptance
and value for this unique quality.249 A common critique of cultural
feminism identifies the paradox between recognizing women's
distinctness and striving for equality between the sexes.25 0 Ac-
knowledging that women have a distinct perspective implies the
existence of a standard from which they differ."' This standard is
generally defined by men. 1 2 Thus, embracing the theory that
"women are distinct" risks accepting a male standard against which
to measure women's experience, a situation that arguably reinforces
existing power inequities between men and women. Cipriani notes
that "[c]ultural feminism . . . risks reinforcing separate sphere
identities and their accompanying stigmas."254
The theory of gender differences in juror decisions presented in
this article is consistent with the philosophy of cultural feminists
and, therefore, creates a tension between the distinctness and
equality of men and women. As cultural feminists have argued,
however, the solution to this problem lies in valuing the distinct
voice that women have and avoiding valuing women's unique
experiences in a way that confines them to the separate, gendered
sphere of domesticity that defined women's role for centuries. 5
Cultural feminism is, thus, a theory with two important compo-
nents: women's voices are acknowledged as distinct from those of
men, and they are valued for the contribution they make to a fuller
understanding of the human experience by incorporating more than
the traditional male viewpoint.256 Placing special emphasis on the
value of the female perspective may help overcome the problem of
potential inequalities stemming from an understanding of women
as distinct from men. In this way, the tension between distinctive-
ness and equality may be resolved, and a theory that women and
men bring unique voices to the jury room can be embraced without
sacrificing the ideal of equality between the sexes.
248. Id. at 1270.
249. Id. at 1272-73.
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III. WHAT DIFFERENCE SHOULD GENDER MAKE?
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, gender can affect both
verdict outcome and sentencing recommendations,257 and women
bring a different voice to the jury room.25 In light of the research
regarding women's rate of participation in jury deliberations,259
reason for concern exists that this "different voice"26° may be lost in
the group deliberative process, leading to verdicts that are made
without the full input of female jurors. More disturbing, however, is
that Supreme Court jurisprudence and most legal policies and
procedures ignore the difference that gender can make in the jury
process.26' As the Court notes in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the "general-
ization" made by the State of Alabama, when using peremptory
challenges to exclude men from the jury, is "overbroad.'262 Accord-
ingly, the Court in J.E.B. found male and female jurors to be
functional equivalents; therefore, any peremptory strike based on
gender alone is impermissible.26'
Acknowledging, however, that male and female jurors are not
fungible raises the obvious question of what effect this information
should have on a system of administering fair and impartial justice.
Specifically, the question arises how this understanding of gender
differences in juror decisions contributes to the current system of
trial by jury in the United States. In addressing these questions,
this article begins with the perspective that jurors necessarily bring
individual biases and experiences, some of which are created by
gender, into the courtroom. In this manner, jurors are removed from
"[tioday's guiding image of the ideal juror [that] has its source in
Enlightenment beliefs about the independence of the objective
world."2"4
In an article questioning traditional conceptions of jurors, Mark
Cammack writes that "recent [research] on human cognition ...
contradicts the assumptions that underlie the legal system's
definition of the ideal juror," because "our contact with reality is
mediated by the assumptions and expectations we have about it.
265
Understanding how individuals, including jurors, perceive reality
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 222, 229 and accompanying text.
260. GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 2.
261. See supra Part II.A-B.
262. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994).
263. Id.
264. Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 427 (1995).
265. Id. at 462.
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and make decisions is particularly relevant to the experience of
women and other minorities. Cammack writes:
Finally, the thesis that the fundamental assumptions which
shape our constructions of reality are not randomly distributed
in the population but follow ethnic, gender, racial, and class
lines is supported by a large body of literature, much of it
written by women and racial and ethnic minorities whose main
message is that the standard account of life in the United States
does not comport with how they experience it.2 66
This article asserts that jurors, as Cammack argues, do bring
unique perspectives to the jury box. Women and other minorities
must have a distinct voice as jurors because their life experiences
differ from the traditional male experience. In formulating sugges-
tions for ensuring that women's voices are heard in the jury room,
this article proceeds from the assumption that female jurors, like
male jurors, make decisions based upon their unique life experi-
ences. Additionally, as the research in Part II.C suggests, it is
important to recognize that jurors do not report their own individual
decisions to the trial judge about the guilt or innocence of the
accused. For this reason, the group deliberative process is critical
because that process affects whether every juror's voice will be
heard. Thus, the second part of the theory proposed in this article
assumes that the group decision-making process is an important
factor in examining how gender affects jury dynamics.
In the proposals for reforming the current jury system, this
article first argues that the criminal jury must be understood as an
instrument that safeguards the rights of the accused in his or her
attempt to defend against the charges brought by the State. Next,
this article analyzes four proposals, in order of most controversial
to least controversial, 67 that could account for gender differences in
the jury room and that ultimately increase the likelihood that a
criminal defendant will receive a fair and impartial trial.
A. Whose Jury Is It?
In Duncan v. Louisiana,26 the Supreme Court explained why
the right to trial by jury is fundamental to the system of justice in
266. Id. at 482.
267. In analyzing the four proposals, this article considers possible critiques of each reform.
268. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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the United States and guaranteed to criminal defendants in state
court under the Fourteenth Amendment.269
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury
trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.... Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inesti-
mable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.27°
As stated, the primary purpose of trial by jury is to protect the rights
of the criminal defendant. 271' Although a jury system also affords
citizens the opportunity to participate in the administration ofjustice
and teaches them about the legal system,272 the function of the jury
as a safeguard for the defendant's rights must be paramount.
Instead of focusing on the rights of criminal defendants, recent
Supreme Court decisions about peremptory challenges have empha-
sized the rights of prospective jurors, and specifically their right not
to be discriminated against in the selection of a petit jury.7 3
Decisions limiting the use of peremptory challenges similarly have
been based largely upon the rights of the excluded jurors. In J.E.B.,
for example, the Court stated that to exclude a juror because of his
or her gender "denigrates the [juror's] dignity." '274 Academic
literature has reiterated this view.275 One proponent of eliminating
gender-based peremptory strikes states that "the exclusion of
individuals based on gender signals that the targeted gender does
not belong to the political community."'276 Drawing an analogy to
"the status or dignitary harm suffered by jurors excluded because of
race,"27 the author argues that excluding a woman solely because
269. Id. at 155-56.
270. Id. (footnote omitted).
271. Id.
272. Marder, supra note 213, at 599.
273. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994) ("Equal opportunity to
participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system....
When persons are excluded from participation . . . solely because of race or gender, this
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized.") (footnote
omitted); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48 (1992) ("[D]enying a person participation in
jury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded
juror.").
274. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142.
275. See, e.g., Note, supra note 67.
276. Id. at 1937.
277. Id.
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of her gender "essentializes [her,] based on gender[,] and ignores her
ability to act as an autonomous individual." '278 Even worse, some
argue, gender-based peremptory challenges "harmf not only the
dignity of the excluded juror, but also indirectly denigrate[] other
members of the group." '279
This analysis about the rights of excluded jurors makes two
unwarranted assumptions. First, the reasoning of most opponents
to gender-based peremptory strikes assumes that women are more
likely than men to be struck from juries during peremptory
challenges.28 ° To the contrary, research about the use of peremptory
challenges in one jurisdiction reveals that "men, and not women, are
more vulnerable to exclusion from modern juries." '' Although
women were undeniably excluded from jury venires for many
years,28 2 the proposition that women were systematically excluded
from modern juries via the use of the peremptory challenge, prior to
the J.E.B. decision in 1994, is unwarranted. Indeed, J.E.B. embod-
ied a challenge not to women's exclusion from the appellant's petit
jury, but rather to the State of Alabama's system of striking men
from the jury in an effort to find jurors more receptive to the State's
claims regarding paternity and child support.8 3
Additionally, many proponents of prohibiting gender-based
peremptory strikes assume that such challenges denigrate women
by sending the message that women are not qualified to participate
in the civic forum of the courtroom.2" One scholar, however, has
recognized that "[t]he peremptory challenge is not a determination
of qualification, but a determination of preference.""2 When pro-
spective jurors are dismissed on a peremptory challenge, instead of
judging the jurors' qualifications, the party striking them is striving
to obtain a jury that will be most receptive to that party's theory of
the case.8 6 If prospective jurors are educated about the jury
278. Id. at 1936. The author of this note, like other proponents of prohibiting gender-based
peremptory challenges, assumes that women, not men, are the primary victims of gender-
based strikes, and that such strikes are a commentary on the female juror's ability to serve
in the jury box. For reasons explained below, this article asserts that both of the assumptions
are faulty.
279. Id. at 1936-37.
280. See, e.g., Cipriani, supra note 106, at 1294 (discussing the J.E.B. Court's reliance on
this erroneous assumption).
281. Id. at 1254.
282. See supra Part L.A and I.B.
283. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129, 137-38 (1994).
284. See, e.g., Flowers, supra note 115, at 532.
285. Id. at 531-32.
286. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the extent to which the legal system should
condone litigants' attempts to seat a jury most favorable to their case.
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selection process,"' and realize that peremptory challenges are not
a reflection of their qualifications, the belief that peremptory
challenges denigrate either male or female jurors is completely
unfounded. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he system degrades
jurors when it assumes they are not intelligent enough to under-
stand the difference between men and women and recognize that
litigants are acting on that reality."2"
When considering the implications of research by Carol Gilligan
and other academics, recognition that such research must be
analyzed in terms of how it contributes to an understanding of a
defendant's right to an impartial jury is crucial. Although prospec-
tive jurors have the right not to be excluded from jury venires, and
purposeful discrimination in choosing a jury should be avoided,8 9
this article asserts that the right of the defendant to receive a fair
trial should be the most compelling consideration. The following
discussion of four suggestions for improving gender representation
and interactions on juries is structured with this principle in mind.
B. Proportional Representation
At least one academic article has proposed requiring propor-
tional representation of men and women on petit juries. 9 ° Although
proportional gender representation seems like a radical idea, and
admittedly is open to criticism on numerous grounds, it would not
be necessarily a difficult system to administer.291 Because men and
women each comprise approximately half of the population, equal
numbers of men and women would comprise randomly-selected
venires.292 Under this system, assuming that juries are generally
composed of twelve people, six men and six women would ultimately
be seated, as well as at least one alternate for each gender.293
Litigants would possess an equal number of peremptory challenges
to exercise for men and women.294 One obvious advantage of this
system is that it eliminates the possibility that peremptory chal-
lenges could be exercised on the basis of gender.295 If an attorney
exercised a peremptory challenge against a juror, that individual
287. See infra Part III.D.
288. Flowers, supra note 115, at 532.
289. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994).




294. Id. at 75-76.
295. Id. at 76.
GENDER AND JURY DELIBERATIONS
would be replaced by someone from the venire of the same gender.296
In light of the current law on peremptory challenges, including the
fact that gender-neutral reasons for striking jurors easily are offered
and accepted,297 a system of proportional representation is signifi-
cantly advantageous because it ensures that jurors truly are seated
without being subjected to discrimination based upon their
gender.298
Another benefit of the proportional representation system is
that it "would leave open the possibility that women indeed do
bring a different voice or vision to the jury room, without the need
to traffic in denigrating or inaccurate stereotypes and without preju-
dice to the litigant's right to an impartial jury."'2 99 Because women
would automatically compose half of the jury, thereby ensuring that
their perspective is reflected in the deliberations, 300 no opportunity
would exist for litigants to strike them from the panel solely on the
basis of their gender. Litigants would not need to make creative use
of peremptory challenges to ensure that more men or more women
were chosen for the petit jury. Ideally, proportional representation
"would more accurately present a microcosm of the real world, and
thus further ensure that a defendant would be tried by a true jury
of her peers. 30 1
Any proposal for proportional gender representation on juries
likely will be criticized on many grounds and ultimately defeated.
First, when the Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana that the
Sixth Amendment requires that jury venires be composed of a fair
cross section of the community, it explicitly stated that its holding did
not require that petit juries be representative of the actual popula-
tion." 2 As a result, some critics may argue that, absent a constitu-
tional need dictated by the Sixth Amendment, the administrative
difficulties and other potential problems 3 would render any benefits
of a system of proportional gender representation on juries too costly.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., id. at 60 (noting that the Supreme Court has implied in recent decisions that
"explanations for peremptory challenges need not be scrutinized too closely" and indicating
that a "danger of pretext" exists when sex discrimination manifests in gender-based
peremptory challenges).
298. Id. at 76.
299. Id.
300. The benefits of a system of proportional gender representation are partly contingent
upon women's actual participation in the deliberations. A jury composed of six men and six
silent women does not advance the unique perspective of women any further than the current
system.
301. Forman, supra note 6, at 76.
302. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
303. For further discussion of difficulties with proportional representation, see infra notes
312-16 and accompanying text.
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A second objection to a system of proportional representation is
that the system violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is a
state classification based on gender. °4 As Forman notes in her article
proposing this system, however, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits only those gender classifications that "are not substantially
related to an important government purpose."3 °5 Proponents may
argue that proportional gender representation meets this standard
because "it is substantially related to two government purposes -
the need to eradicate gender discrimination in jury selection and
specifically in the use of peremptory challenges, and the need to
affirmatively promote inclusion of women on juries."30 6 Moreover,
this system lacks many of the objectionable characteristics of
traditional affirmative action or quota programs because ensuring
equal numbers of men and women on the jury "does not deny
individuals of either gender any benefit which they otherwise would
have to earn, nor does it favor either gender."30 7 If such a system
were ever challenged, however, Forman's argument regarding the
two "important government purposes" of proportional gender
representation would not pass Supreme Court scrutiny.08 The Court
would likely respond that it eradicated gender discrimination in
jury selection in J.E.B. v. Alabama, thus rendering Forman's first
justification moot. Similarly, the Court would probably reject her
argument favoring affirmatively promoting the inclusion of women
on juries, because Supreme Court precedent is clear that the
inclusion of racial, ethnic, and gender groups is required only for the
jury venire, not for the petit jury itself.0 9
Finally, critics argue that instituting proportional gender
representation would set a precedent for proportional racial and
ethnic representation on juries.310 If men and women were required
to serve on juries in equal numbers, making a principled distinction
between proportional gender representation and proportional
representation for minority groups would be difficult. This argument
carries particular significance because fluctuating racial and ethnic
populations in the United States would render the jury system more
difficult to administer if proportional representation were extended
to racial and ethnic groups. 311 Furthermore, proportional gender
304. Forman, supra note 6, at 80.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 82.
308. Id. at 80.
309. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
310. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 6, at 79.
311. Id. at 79-80.
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representation might immediately call to mind racial quotas in other
areas of society, the system may seem distasteful on its very face,
and many people may be disinclined to take the proposal seriously.
In her article advocating a system of proportional gender
representation for jury service, Forman provides a thorough
discussion of, and response to, the criticism that racial and ethnic
representation would follow closely behind a policy of equal
representation for the sexes.312 Numerous administrative barriers
exist to proportional racial or ethnic representation. For example,
because racial and ethnic populations vary in different parts of the
United States, each jurisdiction would need to design its own jury
selection scheme based, one supposes, upon the latest census data.
This data, unlike the data on the gender division, which tends to
hover near fifty percent men and fifty percent women in most areas
of the country,313 might be subject to frequent fluctuations, making
it necessary to revise the proportionality scheme at least every few
years. Additionally, many jurisdictions may lack sufficient numbers
of a minority group necessary to provide a jury pool that would
ensure the selection of an impartial jury.314 Another problem is that
variations in minority populations across different jurisdictions may
lead to forum-shopping based on race, a situation Forman contends
is likely to reinforce racism." 5 Finally, guaranteed racial and ethnic
representation on juries would require jurors to classify themselves
as members of a single racial or ethnic group, "forc[ing] them to
choose between multiple identities.""3 6 Although the gender classi-
fication is close to a simple bifurcation, in most cases requiring
jurors to classify themselves as one race or ethnicity presents a far
more complex choice.
Administrative difficulties aside, a principled reason may exist
against extending proportional representation on juries to racial
and ethnic groups. As the research discussed in Part II of this paper
indicates, theoretical and empirical research supports the claim that
men and women are likely to behave differently as jurors. Whether
a similar claim could be made about jurors belonging to particular
racial or ethnic groups is unclear at this point. The life experiences
of any juror are shaped by numerous factors, including race, gender,
312. Id.
313. See United States Census Data (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Aug.
31, 2005).
314. Forman, supra note 6, at 79.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 80.
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and social class.317 Considering the differences that already appear
to exist based on gender, a similar assertion that race or ethnicity
per se would lead a juror to vote a certain way in the jury room is
unsupportable.
Certainly the same could be said of gender: A woman's behavior
as a juror cannot be ascribed to the juror's experience as a woman
instead of other factors in her life and personal identity. 18 The
fact remains that existing research provides a basis for concluding
that men and women bring unique perspectives to the jury room,319
while research on racial and ethnic categories is not necessarily
conclusive. Given the administrative barriers to proportional racial
and ethnic representation on juries, a compelling argument for lim-
iting proportional representation in jury selection to gender can be
made.32o
C. Limiting J.E.B. to Only Government Strikes
Another proposal for jury reform could be made, arising from the
premise that women bring a different voice to jury deliberations.
Such a proposal would limit the prohibition articulated in J.E.B. v.
Alabama to the government's use of gender-based peremptory
challenges. Such a system would allow a criminal defendant to
eliminate potential jurors strictly on the basis of gender.
As discussed in Part I.C, Justice O'Connor advocated this idea
in her concurring opinion in J.E.B.32' She based her opinion on the
premise that criminal defendants and their attorneys do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause when they strike a juror solely because
of gender.322 As Justice O'Connor wrote, "The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits only discrimination by state actors .... Private
civil litigants are just that -private litigants.""32 Because there is
no state action when a defendant strikes a potential juror, the
defendant does not violate the guarantee of equal protection.
317. Cammack, supra note 264, at 482.
318. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 2.
319. See supra Part II.B.
320. If these administrative barriers could be significantly minimized, nothing would
preclude extending proportional representation on juries to racial and ethnic groups.
Regardless of the situation with racial and ethnic minorities on juries, however, there is a
strong argument that moving to a system of proportional gender representation would not
necessarily have the "slippery slope" effects claimed by its critics.
321. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 150.
323. Id.
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Justice O'Connor made a similar argument in her dissent to
Georgia v. McCollum.324 In McCollum, the Supreme Court extended
the principle of Batson v. Kentucky 25 when it held that "the
Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges." '326 In determining whether state action
exists, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court must ask two
questions." First, it must consider "whether the claimed depriva-
tion has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority,""32 and second, "whether ... the parties
who allegedly caused the deprivation of a federal right can appropri-
ately and in all fairness be characterized as state actors." '329 Justice
O'Connor conceded that the peremptory challenge is a creation of
state authority but disagreed with the majority regarding the
second half of this analysis.33 °
In determining whether criminal defendants are state actors
when they exercise peremptory strikes, O'Connor stated that
"[w]hat our cases require, and what the Court neglects, is a realistic
appraisal of the relationship between the defendants and the
government that has brought them to trial." '331 The adversarial
system of justice requires that a criminal defense attorney act on
behalf of her client's interests, not on behalf of the state.332 Based
upon this reasoning, and the fact that a state can be held responsi-
ble for a private decision only when it has exercised considerable
coercive power over that choice, Justice O'Connor concluded that
peremptory strikes used by defendants do not constitute state
action.333 She also described how racism, both conscious and
unconscious, might affect the way a white juror makes decisions
about a black defendant at trial, explaining that there might be
important reasons to allow criminal defendants to exercise unre-
stricted peremptory challenges. 34 A parallel argument could be
made about the unconscious sexism of male jurors in a case involv-
ing sexual harassment or a defense of battered woman syndrome.
Finally, Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, summarized the
324. 505 U.S. 42, 63 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
326. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 63.
328. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
329. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
330. Id. at 64.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 66.
334. Id. at 68.
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"terminally absurd" proposition of the majority in McCollum by
stating that "[a] criminal defendant; in the process of defending
himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the
state." 35
For these reasons and others, this article argues that allowing
criminal defendants to use gender-based peremptory challenges
without restriction would be consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause. Such a system would allow a defendant to consider a
prospective juror's gender in cases where gender issues are particu-
larly important. For example, Roberta Flowers, arguing that the
costs of the J.E.B. holding are too high, writes that the complicated
factors involved in understanding a defense of battered woman
syndrome "are inextricably linked to, and cannot be separated from,
the juror's gender. 336 Similarly, she states that because men and
women view types of sexual harassment differently, "[a] litigant
must consider the type of harassment in conjunction with the juror's
gender."337 Social science research on male and female reactions to
evidence in rape cases lends further support for the idea that a
defendant might wish to take gender into account when exercising
peremptory challenges. 338 Additionally, permitting criminal defen-
dants to exercise gender-based peremptory strikes could help ensure
that the jury is composed of individuals likely to contribute a variety
of perspectives in the jury room.
This proposal, however, could be criticized as resulting in juries
hand-picked by defendants to be impermissibly partial to their case.
Although the criminal jury is primarily a safeguard for the rights of
the defendant, the jury also serves a powerful function in legitimat-
ing the criminal tribunal and increasing public confidence in the
outcome of the trial.339 A jury chosen entirely by the defendant, with
no input from the prosecution, might be excessively biased towards
the defendant and viewed as illegitimate for that reason. In
contrast, this proposal allows the prosecution to retain the right to
challenge jurors for cause, as well as to use peremptory challenges
without regard for race or gender. The system retains the essential
adversary nature of the selection process for the petit jury. Allowing
defendants to exercise gender-based peremptory challenges would
ensure that they maximize their input in the jury selection process,
particularly in sensitive cases where gender issues are crucial to the
335. Id. at 69-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336. Flowers, supra note 115, at 526.
337. Id.
338. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Part II.A for a more extensive discussion of this point. See also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) (discussing the important functions of the jury trial).
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defense, and allows the government to remain confident in the
legitimating functions of the jury.
A critic of this proposal might counter that juror challenges for
cause are currently sufficient to ensure that defendants achieve a
fair and impartial jury. Assuming that a litigant could strike every
biased juror for cause, a litigant would not need peremptory chal-
lenges that rest on racial or gender classifications and that are
considered impermissible by the Supreme Court. Challenges for
cause may fail to remove truly biased individuals from the petit jury
because these challenges rely on the efficacy of voir dire in identify-
ing the prejudices of prospective jurors. Unless questions asked
during voir dire elicit information indicating that the prospective
juror is biased, no challenge for cause may be made.340 As at least one
commentator has noted, "voir dire has proven singularly ineffective
in revealing bias sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause."34' If
jurors are reluctant to reveal their true prejudices, or if the
questioning is not sufficiently extensive or subtle to elicit such
information, challenges for cause are rendered effectively useless.
Even assuming that the biases of potential jurors become
apparent during voir dire, the showing necesssary to make a
successful challenge for cause is very high. Generally, a challenge
for cause "depends on a showing of actual or clearly implied bias....
Even where a [prospective] juror indicates she has formed an opinion
about a case, the [judge] may seat her on the jury, as long as she
indicates that she believes she can judge the case fairly." 2 The
decision about whether to excuse a juror for cause rests solely
within the discretion of the trial judge.343 Challenges for cause,
therefore, are difficult to secure because the standard for demon-
strating a juror's prejudice is so high.3" For this reason, challenges
for cause do not always sufficiently protect defendants seeking an
impartial jury.
D. Jury Education on Full and Fair Deliberations
Assuming that men and women bring unique perspectives to
jury deliberations, arguably the nature of the deliberations them-
selves, and not the absence of female jurors, silences women's
perspectives in the jury room. Male jurors "speak more often, at
340. Forman, supra note 6, at 67.
341. Id. at 68. See also infra Part III.E for a discussion of the potential shortcomings of voir
dire.
342. Id. at 68-69 (citations omitted).
343. Id. at 68.
344. Id.
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greater length, and are more likely to interrupt other speakers than
women."3 45 Even if women appear on the petit jury in sufficient
numbers, their presence may have little impact if they do not
actively participate. This problem might be partially alleviated if all
jurors were educated about the effects of gender dynamics in their
deliberations.
Courts could use the handbook currently sent to prospective
jurors in most states to begin teaching them about gender dynamics
in group decision-making.3 46 The videotape that introduces prospec-
tive jurors to the legal process could also discuss strategies to
promote effective group deliberations.347 The judge could reinforce
these messages by instructing the jury on the importance of full
participation by all jurors, as well as respectfully listening to others'
point of view.3 48 Additionally, the selection of a female foreperson
could challenge the stereotype that women are not leaders in the
jury room and increase the likelihood that the foreperson would be
concerned with group dynamics and ensure that all jurors are
allowed to speak.349
Educating jurors on the characteristics of effective group
deliberation is a relatively uncontroversial way to increase the
likelihood that women's voices will be heard in the jury room. This
proposal also will likely have benefits beyond its implications for
gender; racial and ethnic minorities might be encouraged to
participate more actively, as well as men who may not participate
as fully as the gender averages indicate. Teaching jurors the
importance of listening carefully to their fellow jurors is an inexpen-
sive proposal, and it has the potential to improve the quality of
deliberations, as well as the accuracy of the verdicts rendered.
E. Effective Use of Voir Dire
Voir dire can be used strategically to question jurors about
potential gender bias on sensitive issues. Indeed, proponents of
345. Marder, supra note 213, at 597.
346. Id. at 607. In a note describing the relative participation rates of male and female
jurors and the importance of ensuring that women's voices are heard, Nancy Marder proposes
that juror handbooks should be utilized for this purpose. Id. She further states that updating
the handbook of the federal courts "would be particularly timely" as the discussion regarding
juror behavior had not been updated in the twenty-five years prior to 1987, when Marder's
note was published. Id.
347. Id. at 608.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 609-10. Marder states that men are currently more likely to be selected as the
foreperson of the jury and that women are more likely to elicit participation from all members
of the group. Id. at 595, 603.
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restrictions on gender-based peremptory challenges advocate relying
on voir dire, rather than generalizations based on gender stereo-
types, to eliminate jurors with gender biases.35 ° For example, an
attorney defending a woman accused of murdering her abusive
husband could probe jurors' attitudes about spousal abuse or ask
the judge conducting voir dire to do so, thus eliciting information
that is useful for deciding which jurors to strike with peremptory
challenges. Even in trials where gender is a subtler issue, voir dire
can effectively minimize sex-based discrimination by eliminating
jurors with certain prejudices.351
Expanding the use of voir dire has several advantages. First,
information gathered during voir dire can help defense attorneys
use peremptory challenges more effectively. In a murder trial
involving a defense of battered woman syndrome, for example, the
defense attorney may choose to strike a male juror based upon the
assumption that the juror would be less receptive to her client's
defense. The particular male juror, however, may defy the odds of
social science research and actually may be sympathetic to the
defense of a woman abused by her husband. Through effective use
of voir dire, the defense lawyer could avoid striking a juror who is
receptive to her client's case. Assuming that gender-based peremp-
tory challenges were still available to the criminal defendant, voir
dire could help the defense attorney more effectively use those
strikes. Alternatively, given the reality of the law on peremptory
challenges since J.E.B., voir dire still provides litigants the oppor-
tunity to question prospective jurors on gender issues, which may
critically affect the outcome of the trial.
Despite its usefulness in combating gender discrimination, the
expansive use of voir dire is not without shortcomings. Extensive
voir dire costs valuable time in courtrooms with already over-
crowded dockets. Lawyers, when permitted to question jurors
themselves, 352 might be under pressure to conduct their questioning
efficiently to conserve the court's time. One scholar notes that
"judges' hostility toward extensive voir dire may discourage lawyers
350. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1994) ("'loir dire provides a means
of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise
their peremptory challenges intelligently."); Note, supra note 67, at 1934 (arguing that "attor-
neys can rely on voir dire to detect the 'situation-specific' bias of prospective jurors," rather
than assuming that prospective jurors are biased because of their gender) (citation omitted).
351. For a discussion of how voir dire can be used to accomplish these goals, see Mark
Soler, "A Woman's Place...": Combating Sex-Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir
Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA L.R. 535 (1975).
352. See Forman, supra note 6, at 69-70 ("In the federal courts and in many state courts,
the judge conducts the voir dire, although usually with joint participation by the attorneys.").
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from full questioning." '353 Attorneys have another incentive to be
expedient in their questioning because lengthy questioning of
prospective jurors may risk irritating the jurors who end up in the
jury box.35 4
Additionally, voir dire may not effectively identify the biases of
potential jurors.355 Jurors may be particularly disinclined to be
forthcoming about their personal opinions when questioned about
sensitive topics like gender discrimination. One study found a
correlation between evaluation anxiety, defined as the jurors' desire
to perform positively, and the degree of honesty in jurors' responses
to questions during voir dire; the more the jurors reported feeling
tense or anxious during the questioning, the more dishonest they
reported being in their answers.35 Sensitive topics like gender
discrimination are particularly likely to produce anxiety.
Even if prospective jurors intend to be completely honest in their
responses to voir dire, they may be influenced by subtler interac-
tions in the questioning. Through a tone of voice or the phrasing of
a question, the questioner may communicate the 'correct' answer to
the jurors. 357 Moreover, jurors harboring unconscious sexist opinions
may seem sensitive to gender issues when questioned in voir dire
but subsequently bring their sexist views into the jury room
nonetheless. Questions posed to prospective jurors by the judge may
be less effective than those posed by attorneys.5 8 Due to the "desire
to please the person in the most authoritative position, jurors
questioned by judges during voir dire may not respond honestly.
Rather, cued by the form of the questions or the judge's demeanor,
the jurors may provide the answer they believe the judge wants to
hear."359
Despite the many potential problems with voir dire, it remains
an effective tool for attorneys in their effort to secure an impartial
jury for their clients. Particularly for defense lawyers, whose use of
race- and gender-based peremptory challenges remains prohibited,
voir dire provides a valuable opportunity to educate prospective
jurors and identify those individuals with the most biased opinions.
353. Id. at 72.
354. Id. at 74.
355. Id. at 72.
356. Id. at 73 (citing Linda L. Marshall & Atthea Smith, The Effects of Demand Charac-
teristics, Evaluation Anxiety and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J.
PSYCHOL. 205, 214 (1986).
357. Id. at 72.
358. Id. at 72 n.227 (citing Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire:
An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987)).
359. Id. at 72.
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Furthermore, the intelligent use of voir dire is the least controver-
sial of the proposals discussed in this article, making it potentially
the most convenient strategy for minimizing gender discrimination
on juries and maximizing the opportunity for women's voices to be
heard.
CONCLUSION
Research by Carol Gilligan suggests, and the work of countless
other social scientists has confirmed, that gender does affect jury
deliberations.36 Although it is impossible to predict, based upon an
individual's gender, how that person will behave as a juror, clear
gender patterns have emerged from the research on juror
behavior.361 As Justice Douglas wrote for the majority in Ballard v.
United States, "the two sexes are not fungible" '362 as jurors, and any
pretense to that effect ignores reality. Men and women, as two
distinct groups in society, bring different perspectives to the jury
room, and the legal system should account for. this fact in its
construction of rules about criminal and civil juries.
Since Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has recognized that
a criminal defendant must be tried before a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community, if the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
a jury of one's peers is to have any practical significance."6 ' A jury
drawn from a fairly representative venire, however, cannot be truly
a jury of one's peers if the perspective of women is absent or
silenced. One article on juror behavior, authored by psychologists
instead of lawyers, aptly concluded that "[i]f racial imbalance on a
jury can violate the civil rights of a defendant, it is likely that male-
female imbalance can violate something of the same.36 4
The research finding gender differences in juror behavior affects
our understanding of what constitutes an 'impartial' juror for
certain trials involving complex gender issues. The classic example
is a woman on trial for murder who claims battered woman
syndrome as a defense. If research indicates that men tend to be
less favorable to this defense, 65 regardless of what the male jurors
might profess in voir dire, a plausible argument is that an impartial
jury would include only jurors who are fairly inclined to accept a
360. See supra Part II.A-B.
361. See supra Part II.C.
362. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
363. 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
364. Davis et al.; supra note 172, at 364.
365. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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defense that is recognized by law. At the very least, such a defen-
dant ought to be allowed to use peremptory challenges, even if they
are based solely on gender, in a manner likely to maximize the
chance of producing an impartial jury.
For these reasons, and others discussed in this article, the
prohibition on gender-based peremptory challenges should be limited
to the government. The urge to achieve absolute parity in the
privileges afforded to each side in a criminal trial is tempting.
Instead, allowing defendants to exercise peremptory strikes, even in
a manner that takes gender into account, is a better system,
considering the accused is relatively disadvantaged in defending
against the State, which has substantial resources. Criminal
defendants should apply the research of social scientists and,
regardless of the information elicited from jurors during voir dire,
make peremptory challenges on the basis of gender alone. A
defendant always risks relying on generalizations that do not apply
in an individual case, and accepting a juror who is actually biased,
or rejecting a juror who might have been impartial. If, however, a
defendant and her attorneys believe that using gender-based
challenges will help obtain a true jury of her peers, then the gender-
based peremptory challenges should be permitted. The most recent
research indicates that gender matters in the jury room. Accordingly,
criminal defendants should be allowed to account for gender in their
selection of a jury.
